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Abstract
Observational learning often involves congestion: an agent gets lower payoff from
an action when more predecessors have taken that action. This preference to act differ-
ently from previous agents may paradoxically increase all but one agent’s probability
of matching the actions of the predecessors. The reason is that when previous agents
conform to their predecessors despite the preference to differ, their actions become more
informative. The desire to match predecessors’ actions may reduce herding by a similar
reasoning.
Keywords: herding, information cascade, social preferences, congestion.
JEL classification: D83, D82, C73, C72.
This paper studies rational agents’ learning from the choices of others when the informa-
tion of others is not directly available. Payoffs are interdependent due to congestion costs: if
more preceding agents choose an action, then an agent’s payoff from taking that action falls.
Congestion arises in many situations, such as when individuals choose a supermarket lane or
other queue, a route to drive or a service provider to use. For firms, choosing a market that
others have entered is less profitable, other things equal.
The model follows the seminal papers of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992)
on herding and information cascades. Agents choose in sequence between two actions, after
observing the previous agents’ actions and a private signal. All agents prefer their action to
match a binary state, which is symmetrically unknown. The payoff of an agent also increases
when the action differs from those of the preceding agents. Such social preferences are also
assumed in Gaigl (2009) and Eyster et al. (2014).
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In equilibrium, the preference for an action different from that of previous agents may
paradoxically increase all but one agent’s probability of matching the actions of the prede-
cessors, compared to the case when payoffs do not depend on others’ actions. When previous
agents choose the same action as their predecessors, congestion costs increase the informa-
tiveness of this action. The reason is that a stronger signal is required to induce an action
when the preceding agents have chosen it. A more informative action in turn motivates
imitation, even when congestion moderately increases the cost of imitating.
Similarly, the desire to conform to previous agents’ actions may reduce herding. If past
agents made the same choice as their predecessors, then these actions are less informative
under a preference to match previous moves. The decreased informativeness of preceding
actions allows an agent’s private signal to outweigh the combined effect of previous moves
and the desire to conform.
In contrast to the current work, both Gaigl (2009) and Eyster et al. (2014) show that
congestion costs reduce herding and, if not too large, improve learning. Large enough con-
gestion costs cause agents to alternate their actions (anti-herd), which decreases learning.
Gaigl (2009) and Eyster et al. (2014) focus on asymptotic learning, but the present paper
considers the probability of each agent matching the actions of his predecessors, as well as
the correct action. As in the previous literature, when the desire to differ is small enough, all
agents take the same action from some finite time onward. In that case, learning is bounded,
i.e. there is positive probability of the wrong action as time goes to infinity.
In Callander and Ho¨rner (2009), agents are differently informed and observe only the
number of previous movers choosing an action, not who chose it. Following the minority is
sometimes optimal.
Other forms of social preference in herding have been studied. In Ali and Kartik (2012),
agents prefer others to take the correct action. Callander (2007) assumes that agents want
to match the eventual majority, thus payoff depends on future agents’ choices, unlike in the
current work.
The next section sets up the model where agents desire to differ from previous movers.
The results are collected in Section 2 and discussed in Section 3. The appendix shows that
a desire to conform may reduce herding.
2
1 Model
Time is discrete, with periods and players indexed by i ∈ N. In period i, player i observes
a private signal si ∈ {L, ℓ, r, R} and chooses a public action ai ∈ {L,R}. The public history
of actions up to time t is denoted at = (a1, . . . , at). Action ai is called uninformative after
history ai−1 if ai(a
i−1, si) is constant in si, and informative otherwise. An information cascade
is said to occur after history at if actions ai, i > t are uninformative after any continuation
history ai = (at, at+1, . . .). Herding after history a
t means that at+1 = at regardless of signals.
Thus a herd is a special case of an information cascade.
An unknown state θ ∈ {L,R} determines payoffs via
ui(a
i, θ) = 1 {ai = θ} −
k
i− 1
i−1∑
j=1
1 {aj = ai} ,
where 1S denotes the indicator function of set S and k ≥ 0 is the congestion cost. If k = 0,
then the environment is standard herding with independent preferences. If k > 0, then each
player prefers to take a different choice than the majority of the previous agents, other things
equal.
The prior probability of state R is p0 ∈ [
1
2
, 1) w.l.o.g. Denote by pS ∈ (0, 1) the uncon-
ditional probability of signal si ∈ {L,R}. Conditional on the state, the probabilities of the
signals are Pr(L|L) = Pr(R|R) = Q ∈
(
pS
2
, pS
)
and Pr(ℓ|L) = Pr(r|R) = q ∈
(
1−pS
2
,
Q(1−pS)
pS
)
.
Therefore Pr(L|R) = Pr(R|L) = pS − Q and Pr(ℓ|R) = Pr(r|L) = 1 − pS − q. Bayesian up-
dating determines each player’s posterior belief pi = Pr(R|a
i−1, si) and log likelihood ratio
li := ln pi − ln(1− pi). Using li instead of pi simplifies the exposition and is mathematically
equivalent. Signals L, ℓ favour state L, in the sense of increasing the posterior probability
of L. Similarly, R, r favour state R. Calling signals ℓ, r weak and L,R strong is justified by
q
1−pS
< Q
pS
, which means that the posterior belief moves more in response to L,R than to
ℓ, r. Assume q > p0(1 − pS), equivalently lq > l0, to ensure signals are informative enough
for even a weak signal s ∈ {ℓ, r} to overturn the prior, i.e. player 1 to believe after signal ℓ
that state L is more likely than R.
Denote the (public) log likelihood ratio of player i > 1 before observing si by li(a
i−1).
Action a˜i ∈ {L,R} is called more informative than aˆj ∈ {L,R} if |li+1((a
i−1, a˜i))−li(a
i−1)| ≥
|lj+1((a
j−1, aˆj))− lj(a
j−1)| for any ai−1, aj−1, which means that a˜i moves the public log like-
lihood ratio li+1 more than aˆj moves lj+1.
To derive player i’s private log likelihood ratios li(a
i−1, si) after a
i−1, si, define
lQ := lnQ− ln(pS −Q) > 0,
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lq := ln q − ln(1− pS − q) ∈ (0, lQ),
lQq := ln(Q+ q)− ln(1−Q− q) ∈ (lq, lQ) and
l¬Q := ln(1− pS +Q)− ln(1−Q) ∈ (0, lQq),
where lQ, lq are the log likelihood ratios of strong and weak signals respectively. The log
likelihood ratio lQq does not distinguish strong and weak signals, only whether the signal
favours L or R. If the strong signal in favour of one state is distinguishable from the other
three, but the latter look identical to an agent, then upon not seeing the distinguishable
strong signal, the agent uses l¬Q to update. The (private) log likelihood ratios of i upon
observing si are
li(a
i−1, L) = li(a
i−1)− lQ, li(a
i−1, ℓ) = li(a
i−1)− lq,
li(a
i−1, R) = li(a
i−1) + lQ, li(a
i−1, r) = li(a
i−1) + lq.
Note that li(a
i−1, R) = 2li(a
i−1)− li(a
i−1, L) and li(a
i−1, r) = 2li(a
i−1)− li(a
i−1, ℓ).
The expected utility of player i with log likelihood ratio l from action ai = R if fraction
f of previous players chose R is exp(l)
1+exp(l)
− fk, but the expected utility from ai = L is
1
1+exp(l)
− (1− f)k. The payoff difference ∆(l, f) := exp(l)−1
1+exp(l)
+ (1− 2f)k determines the best
response: player i chooses R if ∆(l, f) > 0 and only if ∆(l, f) ≥ 0. Define the cutoff log
likelihood ratio
lk(f) := ln(1− k + 2fk)− ln(1 + k − 2fk) (1)
at which a player switches from action L to R. Clearly lk(
1
2
) = 0 and lk(1) = −lk(0).
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The next section derives the optimal action choices of the players and provides sufficient
conditions for herding to increase when players want to take a different action from their
predecessors.
2 Beliefs and best responses
Player 1 chooses a1 = L after signals L, ℓ and a1 = R after R, r, due to the assumption
lq > l0. There are no predecessors for player 1, so the optimal action a
∗
1 does not depend on
k. Similarly, if exactly half the predecessors of an odd-numbered player 2i− 1 choose action
L, then k does not affect a2i−1.
Given lq > l0, player 2’s log likelihood ratios conditional on player 1’s action a1 are
l2(L) = l0 − lQq and l2(R) = l0 + lQq before observing s2. The interpretation of a1 = L
1More generally, lk is antisymmetric around
1
2
, i.e. lk(f) = −lk(
1
2
− f) for any f ≥ 1
2
.
4
from player 2’s perspective is as the ‘average’ of the signals L and ℓ, and similarly a1 = R.
If the congestion cost is not too large and the prior not too extreme, then the action of
player 2 responds to s2. Lemma 1 characterises when the actions of the first two agents are
informative.
Lemma 1. Player 1’s action is informative if lQ > l0 and only if lQ ≥ l0. Player 2’s action
is informative after any a1 if lq > l0, l0 − lQq − lQ < lk(0) and l0 + lQq − lQ < lk(1).
Proof. If lQ > l0, then l1(L) < 0, so a1(L) = L. Due to l0 > 0, a1(r) = a1(R) = R, thus a1 is
informative. If lQ < l0, then l1(L) > 0, so a1 = R for any s1.
Clearly a2(L,R) = R for any k ≥ 0. Before observing s2, if lq > l0, then l2(L) = l0 − lQq
and l2(R) = l0 + lQq. Then l0 − lQq − lQ < lk(0) implies ∆(l2(L, L), f) < 0, so a2(L, L) = L,
ensuring that a2 is informative after a1 = L.
The condition l0+ lQq+ lQ > lk(1) ensuring a2(R,R) = R is implied by l0−lQq−lQ < lk(0)
and lk(0) = −lk(1). If l0 + lQq − lQ < lk(1), then a2(R,L) = L, thus a2 is informative after
a1 = R.
The maintained assumption lq > l0 implies lQ > l0, which ensures a1 is informative
by Lemma 1. The conditions sufficient for a2 to be informative are not necessary. The
interpretation of l0− lQq− lQ+ lk(1) < 0 is that the congestion cost is small enough for player
2 not to ignore own signal just to take a different action from player 1. If l0+lQq−lQ−lk(1) < 0,
then the prior probability of state R is low enough that a strong signal s2 = L in favour of
L together with the preference to differ outweighs the prior and player 1’s action a1 = R.
Next, sufficient conditions are provided for herding to increase after the introduction
of the desire to differ from previous agents. Increased herding means that actions become
uninformative after some histories, but not the reverse. The set of histories after which
herding occurs under k > 0, but not under k = 0 can have probability close to 1, as the
numerical example after Proposition 2 demonstrates. Proposition 2 proves increased herding
for the first four players under k > 0 compared to k = 0. After that, Lemma 3 shows that
player 5 also herds more under k > 0.
Proposition 2. Assume lq > l0 and l0 − lQq − lQ + lk(1) < 0.
(a) If k = 0, l0− lQq + lq < 0 and l0+ lQq + l¬Q− lQ < 0, then a3 is informative after any a
2.
(b) If k > 0, l0 + lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 − 2lQq + lQ + lk(1) < 0, then a3 is uninformative
after a1 = a2, the probability of which is (Q + q)
2 + (1 − Q − q)2 > 1
2
. If in addition
l0 + lQq − lq − lk
(
i+1
2i+1
)
< 0, then a2i+3 is uninformative after a2i+1 = a2i+2.
(c) If l0 − lQq + l¬Q < 0 and a4(a
3, s3) is informative under k > 0, then also under k = 0.
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Proof. (a) The condition l0 + lQq − lQ − lk(1) < 0 is implied by l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lQ < 0 and
by l0 + lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0. Recall lk(f) = −lk(
1
2
− f).
If lq > l0, then a1(L) = a1(ℓ) = L and a1(R) = a1(r) = R. In this case, l0−lQq−lQ+lk(1) <
0 ensures a2(L, L) = L. If k = 0, l0 − lQq + lq < 0 and l0 + lQq − lQ − lk(1) < 0, then player
2’s actions are a2(R, s2 6= L) = R = a2(L,R) and a2(R,L) = L = a2(L, s2 6= R), so
l3(L, L) = l0 − lQq − l¬Q, l3(L,R) = l0 − lQq + lQ,
l3(R,L) = l0 + lQq − lQ, l3(R,R) = l0 + lQq + l¬Q.
When k = 0 and l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lQ < 0, player 3’s action is informative after a1 = a2:
private history (a2, s3) l3(a
2, s3) a3(a
2, s3)
R,R, L l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lQ < 0 L
R,R, s3 6= L ≥ l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lq > 0 R
L,L,R l0 − lQq − l¬Q + lQ > 0 R
L,L, s3 ∈ {ℓ, L} ≤ l0 − lQq − l¬Q − lq < 0 L
If k = 0, then a3 is informative after a1 6= a2 = R, because l3(L,R, L) = l0 − lQq < 0
due to lQq > lq > l0, and l3(L,R, r) = l0 − lQq + lQ + lq > 0. Action a3 is informative after
a1 6= a2 = L, because l3(R,L,R) = l0 + lQq > 0 and l3(R,L, L) = l0 + lQq − 2lQ < 0 due to
lQ > lQq > l0.
(b) If k > 0, lq > l0, l0 + lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 − lQq + lq + lk(1) < 0, then
a2(a1, L) = a2(a1, ℓ) = L and a2(a1, R) = a2(a1, r) = R for any a1, so l3(L, L) = l0 − 2lQq,
l3(L,R) = l3(R,L) = l0 and l3(R,R) = l0 + 2lQq.
If k > 0 and l3(L, L,R) = l0 − 2lQq + lQ + lk(1) < 0, then l3(L, L, s3) < 0 for any s3, so
a3(L, L, s3) = L for any s3. The condition l0−2lQq+lQ+lk(1) < 0 implies l0+2lQq−lQ−lk(1) >
0, so l3(R,R, s3) > 0 and a3(R,R, s3) = R for any s3. If player 3 herds after a2 = a1, then
so do all subsequent players, because f = 1 remains unchanged. More generally, if player
i herds after some history ai−1 and |f − 1
2
| weakly decreases over time, then all subsequent
players j > i also herd after any continuation of ai−1.
In the k > 0 case, if a1 6= a2, l0 + lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 − lQq + lq + lk(1) < 0,
then l3(a
2) = l0 and f =
1
2
, so a3 is informative by lq > l0. For any period j, if f =
1
2
,
then j is odd, lj(a
j−1) = l0 and if aj+1 = aj, then in period j + 2, f =
(j−1)/2+2
j+1
. If
l0 − lQq + lq + lk(1) < 0, then l0 − lQq + lq + lk(f) < 0 for any f ≤ 1. Whenever f =
1
2
and lj(a
j−1) = l0, the game essentially restarts, with player j in the role of player 1 and
a reduced lk(f), because f responds less to aj+1 = aj . Therefore if a herd has not started
after a2i (which implies a2t 6= a2t−1 for all t ≤ i), then it starts after (a
2i, L, L), and if
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Table 1: Public log likelihood ratios of player 4 before seeing s4, and conditions under which
a4 responds to s4. Maintained assumptions: l0 − lQq + lq < 0, l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lQ < 0,
l0 + lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 − 2lQq + lQ + lk(1) < 0.
l4(a
3) a4(a
3, s4) responds to s4 if
history a3 k = 0 k > 0 k = 0 k > 0
L, L, L l0 − lQq − 2l¬Q l0 − 2lQq l0 − lQq − 2l¬Q + lQ > 0 never
R,R,R l0 + lQq + 2l¬Q l0 + 2lQq l0 + lQq + 2l¬Q − lQ < 0 never
L, L,R l0 − lQq − l¬Q + lQ off-path always never
R,R, L l0 + lQq + l¬Q − lQ off-path always never
L,R, L l0 − lQq + lQ − lQ l0 − lQq always always
R,L,R l0 + lQq − lQ + lQ l0 + lQq always always
L,R,R l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q l0 + lQq l0 − lQq + l¬Q < 0 always
R,L, L l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q l0 − lQq always always
l0 + lQq − lq − lk
(
i+1
2i+1
)
< 0, then also after (a2i, R, R). The conditional probability of a herd
is Pr(a2i+2 = a2i+1|a2i+1 6= a2i) = 1− 2(Q+ q)(1−Q− q) = (Q + q)
2 + (1−Q− q)2.
(c) Table 1 displays l3(a
3) in the cases k = 0 and k > 0, as well as the conditions
for a4(a
3, s3) to be informative. Sufficient for a4(a
3, s3) to be informative under k = 0 is
that l3(a
3, L) < 0 < l3(a
3, R), which is how the fourth column of Table 1 is derived from the
second. Under k > 0, if a1 = a2, then herding already started from a3, so a4 is uninformative.
If a1 6= a2, then player 4 faces the same decision problem as player 2, so by Lemma 1, a4 is
informative for any a3. More generally, if a2t−1 6= a2t for all t < i, then player 2i faces the
same decision problem as player 2, so by Lemma 1, a2i is informative for any a2i−1. Table 1
shows that if a4 is informative under k > 0 and l0 − lQq + l¬Q < 0, then a4 is informative
under k = 0.
Proposition 2 is not vacuous—two numerical examples satisfying the assumptions are
presented next.
Example 1. Take either p0 =
1
2
, pS =
61
64
, Q = 15611
16384
, q = 9
256
and any k ∈ [0, 1
3
], or p0 =
5
8
,
pS =
61
64
, Q = 3903
4096
, q = 9
256
and k ≈ 0.01. In both cases, player 3’s herding probability
increases from 0 to (Q + q)2 + (1 − Q − q)2 ≈ 0.98. Herding by player 4 (and 5 and 6, as
Lemmas 3, 4 below show) increases after every history.
The intuition for the condition lq > l0 in Proposition 2 is that player 1’s weak signal
outweighs the prior, so player 1 always follows own signal. The assumption l0 − lQq + lq < 0
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ensures that with k = 0, the prior p0 is close enough to
1
2
for player 2’s weak signal in favour
of state R not to outweigh the “average” signal (which is player 1’s action) favouring state
L. The best response of player 2 is then to follow player 1 except when s2 is strong and
disagrees with a1.
From player 3’s perspective, observing a2 6= a1 is equivalent to seeing a strong signal
s2 = a2, but observing a2 = a1 conflates the three other signals ℓ, r and s3 ∈ {L,R}\{a2}, in
which case 3’s log likelihood ratio moves by only l¬Q. The intuition for l0+ lQq+ l¬Q− lQ < 0
is that the effect lQ of a strong signal outweighs the combined prior l0, average signal lQq and
the conflation l¬Q of three signals when k = 0. Thus player 3 always follows a strong signal
s3 ∈ {L,R}, regardless of whether s3 6= a2, so a3 is informative.
Under k > 0, the assumption l0+ lQq − lq − lk(1) < 0 ensures that player 2 always follows
own signal, because the desire to differ2 from player 1 combines with the effect of a weak
signal to outweigh the prior and the information derived from a1. This choice of player 2 to
follow s2 increases the informativeness of a2 = a1, but decreases that of a2 6= a1. The more
informative event a2 = a1 together with l0 − 2lQq + lQ + lk(1) < 0 induces player 3 to herd,
because even a strong signal plus the desire to differ lk(1) do not overcome the effect 2lQq
of two “average” signals. If player 3 herds after a2 = a1, then so do all subsequent players,
because they have the same signal strengths and desire to differ.
The less informative a2 6= a1 under k > 0 does not reduce player 3’s herding, because even
under k = 0, player 3 follows a strong signal after a2 6= a1. No additional assumptions are
needed, because a2 6= a1 is either a strong signal (if k = 0) or average (if k > 0) favouring the
opposite state to a1. The average signal from a2 6= a1 neutralises a1, so lq > l0 is sufficient for
a3 to respond to even weak signals. The strong signal from a2 6= a1 under k = 0 is neutralised
by player 3’s strong private signal s3 ∈ {L,R} \ {a2}, in which case a3 = a1. On the other
hand, if s3 = a2, then a3 = a2 6= a1, so the action of player 3 is informative in the k = 0 case
as well.
In Table 1, l0+ lQq+2l¬Q− lQ < 0 on the line corresponding to history ai = R is sufficient
for l0−lQq−2l¬Q+lQ > 0 on the ai = L line. The intuition for these conditions is that a strong
signal s5 overwhelms the effect of an “average” signal from a1 plus two conflations (a2 and
a3) of the three signals other than a strong one opposing a1. The condition l0+ lQq− l¬Q > 0
for a4(R,L, L, s4) to respond to s4 under k = 0 always holds (so is omitted from the last line
of Table 1), because l0 ≥ 0 and lQq > l¬Q. The maintained assumption l0 − lQq + lq < 0 is
logically independent of the condition l0−lQq+l¬Q < 0 ensuring an informative a4(L,R,R, s4)
2 If l0 − lQq − lq < −lk(1), which is implied by l0 − 2lQq + lQ < −lk(1) and lQ > lQq, then player 2 does
not ignore s2 just to ensure a2 6= a1, i.e. k is small enough not to induce an anti-herding information cascade.
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(penultimate line in Table 1), because both lq > l¬Q and lq < l¬Q are possible. The reason
why l0− lQq+ l¬Q < 0 is sufficient for a4(L,R,R, s4) to respond to s4 is that the strong signal
from a2 6= a1 = L is cancelled by s4 = L, resulting in l4(L,R,R, L) < 0, but if s4 ∈ {r, R},
then l4(L,R,R, s4) > 0.
The next lemma compares the informativeness of a5 under k = 0 to the k > 0 case. It
complements Proposition 2 by showing that in addition to the increased herding by the first
four agents, player 5 also responds less to signals. A similar result for player 6 is subsequently
derived in Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. If l0 − lQq + l¬Q < 0 and a5(a
4, s5) is informative under k > 0, then a5(a
4, s5) is
also informative under k = 0.
Proof. History a3 = (R,L, L). Under k = 0, if l4(R,L, L, r) = l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q + lq < 0,
then player 5’s log likelihood ratios continuing from a3 = (R,L, L) are l5(R,L, L, L) =
l0+ lQq− lQ− l¬Q− l¬Q and l5(R,L, L,R) = l0+ lQq− lQ− l¬Q+ lQ, because player 4 chooses
L after a weak signal s4 = r. In this case, a5 responds to s5 if l0 + lQq − 2l¬Q > 0, because
l5(R,L, L, L,R) = l0 + lQq − 2l¬Q and l5(R,L, L, L, L) = l0 + lQq − 2lQ − 2l¬Q < 0. After
(R,L, L,R), player 5’s action always responds to the private signal. By comparison, recall
that when k > 0, player 5 (and any odd player) herds if the preceding two players took the
same action.
On the other hand, if l4(R,L, L, r) > 0, then l5(R,L, L, L) = l0+ lQq − lQ− l¬Q− lQq and
l5(R,L, L,R) = l0+ lQq− lQ− l¬Q+ lQq, because player 4 chooses L after a weak signal s4 = r.
In this case, a5 responds to s5 if l5(R,L, L, L,R) = l0 − l¬Q > 0 (again, a5 always responds
if the a4 contains an equal number of L,R). The condition l0 − l¬Q > 0 fails in Example 1
above, so player 5 herds. When k > 0, player 5 always herds after history (R,L, L, L).
History a3 = (L,R,R). If l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q − lq > 0, then l5(L,R,R, L) = l0 − lQq +
lQ + l¬Q − lQ and l5(L,R,R,R) = l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q + l¬Q, because a4(L,R,R, ℓ) = R. The
condition for a5 to respond to s5 is l5(L,R,R,R, L) = l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q + l¬Q − lQ < 0, the
same as for a4 to be informative after a
3 = (L,R,R).
In contrast, if l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q − lq < 0, then l5(L,R,R, L) = l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q − lQq
and l5(L,R,R,R) = l0− lQq+ lQ+ l¬Q+ lQq. Action a5 is always informative after L,R,R, L,
but never after L,R,R,R (just like with k > 0), because l5(L,R,R,R, L) = l0 + l¬Q > 0.
Histories a3 = (R,L,R) and (L,R, L) lead to l4(a
3) = l0± lQq, so player 4 faces the same
decision problem as player 2. Thus continuing from these histories, any player herds more
under k > 0 than under k = 0. For histories in the top half of Table 1, herding has already
started with player 3, so all subsequent players unambiguously herd more under k > 0.
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Lemma 4 compares the informativeness of the action a6 of player 6 under k = 0 and
k > 0, analogously to Lemma 3 for a5.
Lemma 4. If l0+2lQq−l¬Q−lQ < 0 and a6(a
5, s6) is informative under k > 0, then a6(a
5, s6)
is also informative under k = 0.
Proof. Based on Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, the only histories continuing from which player
6 could conceivably herd more under k = 0 are a4 = (L,R,R, L) and (R,L, L,R). In these
continuations, under k > 0, player 6 faces the same decision as player 2, but this need not
be the case under k = 0. Consider first a4 = (R,L, L,R). Separate two cases based on the
sign of l4(R,L, L, r) = l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q + lq.
If l0+ lQq− lQ− l¬Q+ lq < 0, then l5(R,L, L,R) = l0+ lQq− l¬Q. In this case, if l0+ lQq−
l¬Q − lq < 0, then l6(R,L, L,R, L) = l0 − l¬Q (so a6 is informative) and l6(R,L, L,R,R) =
l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q. Then a6 is informative if l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q − lQ < 0.
The other case given l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q + lq < 0 is l0 + lQq − l¬Q − lq > 0, which implies
l6(R,L, L,R, L) = l0 + lQq − l¬Q − lQ and l6(R,L, L,R,R) = l0 + lQq − l¬Q + l¬Q, for both of
which, a6 is informative.
If l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q + lq > 0, then l5(R,L, L,R) = l0 + 2lQq − lQ − l¬Q. In this case, if
l0+2lQq− lQ− l¬Q− lq < 0 (implied by l0+2lQq− lQ− l¬Q < 0) and l0+2lQq− lQ− l¬Q+ lq > 0
(implied by l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q + lq > 0), then l6(R,L, L,R, L) = l0 + lQq − lQ − l¬Q (so a6 is
informative) and l6(R,L, L,R,R) = l0+3lQq− lQ− l¬Q. Therefore if l0+3lQq−2lQ− l¬Q < 0
(which is implied by l0 + 2lQq − lQ − l¬Q < 0), then a6 is informative.
Consider next a4 = (L,R,R, L), so l4(L,R,R, ℓ) = l0− lQq+ lQ+ l¬Q− lq. If l0− lQq+ lQ+
l¬Q − lq > 0, then l5(L,R,R, L) = l0 − lQq + l¬Q. In this case, if l0 − lQq + l¬Q + lq > 0, then
l6(L,R,R, L,R) = l0+ l¬Q (so a6 is informative) and l6(L,R,R, L, L) = l0−2lQq+ l¬Q. Then
a6 is informative if l0 − 2lQq + l¬Q + lQ > 0, sufficient for which is l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q − lQ < 0.
The other case given l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q − lq > 0 is l0 − lQq + l¬Q + lq < 0, which
implies l6(L,R,R, L,R) = l0 − lQq + l¬Q + lQ and l6(L,R,R, L, L) = l0 − lQq + l¬Q − l¬Q, so
a6(L,R,R, L, L, s6) is informative. Action a6(L,R,R, L,R, s6) is informative if l0−lQq+l¬Q <
0, which is implied by l0 − lQq + l¬Q + lq < 0.
If l0 − lQq + lQ + l¬Q − lq < 0, then l5(L,R,R, L) = l0 − 2lQq + lQ + l¬Q. In this
case, if l0 − 2lQq + lQ + l¬Q + lq > 0 (which is implied by l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q − lQ < 0) and
l0− 2lQq + lQ+ l¬Q− lq < 0 (implied by l0− lQq + lQ+ l¬Q− lq < 0), then l6(L,R,R, L,R) =
l0−lQq+lQ+l¬Q, so a6(L,R,R, L,R, s6) is informative, because l0−lQq+lQ+l¬Q−lq < 0 implies
l0− lQq+ l¬Q < 0. Also, l6(L,R,R, L, L) = l0−3lQq+ lQ+ l¬Q, thus if l0−3lQq+2lQ+ l¬Q > 0
(sufficient for which is l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q − lQ < 0), then a6 is informative.
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The assumption l0 + 2lQq − l¬Q − lQ < 0 in Lemma 4 that suffices for player 6 to herd
more under k > 0 is satisfied in the Example 1 above. Therefore the set of histories in which
the first six players herd under k > 0 is a proper superset of the histories in which they herd
under k = 0.
In some long enough histories, the probability of herding under k = 0 may overtake that
under k > 0. This is because the effective congestion cost decreases when f approaches 1
2
,
which occurs each time the history lengthens by two actions without a herd having started.
Eyster et al. (2014) show that as the congestion cost approaches zero, learning increases in the
limit as time goes to infinity. The comparison of the limiting probabilities of learning under
k = 0 and k > 0 is complicated, because it depends on the speed of convergence of |f − 1
2
| in
the present paper relative to that of the congestion cost in Eyster et al. (2014). What is clear
is that discounting the benefit of agents in the far future learning makes the welfare impact
of the large initial increase in herding under k > 0 overwhelm any eventual overtaking of
the learning probability under k = 0. In other words, the discounted probability of correct
decisions is significantly smaller when there is a desire to differ from previous movers.
3 Discussion
The result that herding may increase with the desire to differ from previous movers is ro-
bust to varying the informativeness of signals or the congestion cost within some bounds.
The informativeness and cost may also differ to some extent across players. Unboundedly
informative signals or a strong enough preference for non-conformity break herding, as es-
tablished in the previous literature. If the congestion cost is small enough, then it does not
affect players’ actions, because it does not outweigh the weakest of the finitely many signals.
In some applications, the congestion cost depends only on the actions of some preceding
agents, not all. For example, if a service provider is capacity constrained and can serve only
m agents at a time or finishes the service in at most m periods, then an agent’s payoff only
depends on the choices of the m immediate predecessors. The desire to differ may increase
conformity also in this case, as is clear from redefining f in Section 2 to be the fraction of
agents among the preceding m who choose R.
Even if congestion depends only on the immediately preceding agent, a more informative
a2 = a1 can motivate player 3 to herd. The less informative a2 6= a1 cannot reduce player 3’s
herding compared to the k = 0 case if 3 does not herd after a2 6= a1 under k = 0. Thus the
overall probability of herding may increase, as in the baseline model. The proofs simplify,
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because each time the belief returns to the prior, the subgame is identical to the whole game.
In particular, the condition l0 + lQq − lq − lk
(
i+1
2i+1
)
< 0 in Proposition 2 for herding to start
in period 2i+3 conditional on not having started earlier may be omitted w.l.o.g., because it
reduces to l0 + lQq − lq − lk (1) < 0.
Qualitatively similar results also obtain if congestion depends on a discounted (or oth-
erwise weighted) average of the actions of previous movers. Again, player 3 faces the same
problem as in the baseline model, and the problems of subsequent odd players only differ in
the effective congestion cost.
A Herding reduced by the desire to conform
This section shows that a preference to match the actions of preceding agents may in fact
reduce herding. The idea is similar to why the desire to differ may increase herding—the
actions of previous players become more informative after some histories, less after others. In
the current section, it is the less informative actions that matter. A strong signal overwhelms
the effect of two previous less informative actions plus the desire to conform, but does not
outweigh the more informative actions in the absence of a preference to follow previous
movers.
Only the differences from the setup in Section 1 are mentioned. Payoffs are
ui(a
i, θ) = 1 {ai = θ}+
k
i− 1
i−1∑
j=1
1 {aj = ai} ,
where k ≥ 0 as before, but here the payoff from an action increases in the fraction f of
previous agents taking that action.
There are six possible signal realisations si ∈ {L, ℓ, λ, ρ, r, R}, with ℓ, r interpreted as
medium strength and λ, ρ as weak. Signals L, ℓ, λ favour state L, the others R. The respective
unconditional probabilities of a strong, medium and weak signal are pS := Pr(L) + Pr(R),
ps := Pr(ℓ) + Pr(ℓ) and pσ := Pr(λ) + Pr(ρ). The conditional probabilities are Pr(L|L) =
Pr(R|R) =: Q, Pr(ℓ|L) = Pr(r|R) =: q and Pr(λ|L) = Pr(ρ|R) =: η. Assume 1
2
< η
pσ
< q
ps
<
Q
pS
< 1, which justifies the interpretations of the signals. Define
lq := ln q − ln(ps −Q) ∈ (0, lQ),
lη := ln η − ln(pσ − η) ∈ (0, lq),
lQq := ln(Q+ q)− ln(pS + ps −Q− q) ∈ (lq, lQ),
lQqη := ln(Q + q + η)− ln(1−Q− q − η) ∈ (lη, lQ),
l¬qQ := ln(pσ + q +Q)− ln(1− q −Q) ∈ (0, lQqη),
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l¬Q := ln(ps + pσ +Q)− ln(1−Q) ∈ (0, l¬qQ).
The next result is analogous to Proposition 2 and provides sufficient conditions for herding
to decrease when conformism is introduced.
Proposition 5. Assume lη > l0. If k = 0, l0 + lQqη − lq < 0, l0 − lQqη + lη < 0 and
l0 − lQqη − l¬qQ + lQ < 0, then a3 is uninformative after a2 = a1, the probability of which is
(Q+ q + η)(pσ + q +Q) + (1−Q− q − η)(1− q −Q).
If k > 0, l0 − lQqη + lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 + lQqη + l¬Q− lQ + lk(1) < 0, then a3 is informative
after any history.
Proof. The assumption l0 < lη ensures that player 1 follows own signal. Then player 2’s
public log likelihood ratios are l2(L) = l0 − lQqη and l2(R) = l0 + lQqη.
k = 0. Assume l0 + lQqη − lq < 0 and l0− lQqη + lη < 0, so a2(R, ℓ) = a2(L, ρ) = L and by
implication, a2(L, r) = a2(R, λ) = R. Player 3’s log likelihood ratios before seeing s3 are
l3(L, L) = l0 − lQqη − l¬qQ, l3(L,R) = l0 − lQqη + lQq,
l3(R,L) = l0 + lQqη − lQq, l3(R,R) = l0 + lQqη + l¬qQ.
If l0 − lQqη − l¬qQ + lQ < 0, then a3 is uninformative after a2 = a1, i.e. a herd starts. After
a2 6= a1, player 3’s action always responds to signals.
k > 0. If l0 − lQqη + lq − lk(1) < 0 and l0 + lQqη − lQ + lk(1) < 0 (which is implied
by l0 + lQqη + l¬Q − lQ + lk(1) < 0), then a2(L, r) = a2(R,L) = L and by implication,
a2(R, ℓ) = a2(L,R) = R. Player 3’s log likelihood ratios before observing s3 are then
l3(L, L) = l0 − lQqη − l¬Q, l3(L,R) = l0 − lQqη + lQ,
l3(R,L) = l0 + lQqη − lQ, l3(R,R) = l0 + lQqη + l¬Q.
If l0 + lQqη + l¬Q − lQ + lk(1) < 0, then a strong signal switches the sign of l3(R,R), so a3 is
informative after a2 = a1 = R and by implication after any history.
The next example exhibits parameter values satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 5.
Example 2. Let l0 = 0, pS =
4
5
, ps = pσ =
1
10
, Q
pS
≈ 0.984, q
ps
≈ 0.93, η
pσ
≈ 0.5 and
k ≈ 1.9 · 10−6, or alternatively p0 = 0.51, pS =
4
5
, ps = pσ =
1
10
, Q
pS
≈ 0.987, q
ps
≈ 0.935,
η
pσ
≈ 0.5002 and k ≈ 0.04.
The probability of a2 = a1 is (Q+ q+ η)(pσ + q+Q) + (1−Q− q− η)(1− q−Q) ≈ 0.92
under k = 0, but (Q + q + η)(pσ + ps + Q) + (1 − Q − q − η)(1 − Q) ≈ 0.94 under k > 0.
Thus in both examples, the probability that the action of player 3 is informative rises from
about 0.08 to 1 when the desire to conform is introduced.
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